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ALTERNATIVE GROWTH: FORSAKING THE FALSE
ECONOMIES OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE
Jason Foscolo* and Michael Zimmerman**
"Agricultural exceptionalism" is the pervasive notion that because
food production is so central to human survival, agriculture should be
entitled to special legal and regulatory advantage.' Beginning with
the first Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Congress and the
courts have built a safety net of statutory exclusions and economic
subsidies to support what has become known as "conventional
agriculture": large-scale, highly mechanized, monocultural plant and
animal production.2 The intentional result of this safety net has been
a bouquet of special entitlements enjoyed by members of almost no
other industry. Farmers are insulated from crop losses due to
meteorological or biological catastrophe by federally underwritten
insurance programs and from economic loss due to global price
3fluctuations on the commodity market. Farmers enjoy their own
* Jason Foscolo is the principal attorney at Jason Foscolo LLC, a general practice
law firm for farmers and food entrepreneurs.
** J.D., magna cum laude, Fordham University School of Law. Michael would like
to thank the dedicated staff at the Fordham Environmental Law Review for their
help in bringing this Article to fruition.
1. See Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration ofAgricultural Law: A Call for
the Law of Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 935, 935-36 (2010).
2. See generally Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933). Conventional
agriculture currently produces about ninety-eight percent of the food consumed in
the United States (though much of it is not consumed by humans). See Jodi Soyars
Windham, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Perverse Food Subsidies,
Social Responsibility & America's 2007 Farm Bill, 31 U.C. DAVIS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J. 1, 4 (2007).
3. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2012). The federal government has been
involved in the crop insurance business since 1938, when Congress created the
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to offset the combined agricultural disasters of
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bankruptcy code,4 as well as a limited, but still powerful, exemption
from anti-trust laws in the Capper-Volstead Act.
Agricultural policy coalesced around the notion of agricultural
exceptionalism around the same time as the birth of the modem
environmental movement, which precipitated important legal and
regulatory developments to protect natural resources like air, water,
and wildlife.6 Because it relies on subverting natural processes for
human ends, all agricultural activity has some negative impact on the
environment, however minimal. Some tension in the policies
governing these competing interests was inevitable. Yet rather than
reach a middle ground that balanced agriculture and environmental
conservation, policymakers largely yielded to agricultural
exceptionalism-nearly every major federal environmental statute
passed since the 1970s has included carve-outs for farms.7 As it
pertains to conventional agriculture, the current state of
environmental law is characterized more by exemption than
inclusion, a systematic lack of governance that J.B. Ruhl aptly terms
"anti-law."
This dearth of environmental regulation in conventional
agriculture, combined with the enormous monetary subsidies it
receives, 9 pulls food markets away from economic efficiency.10 One
the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,
Pub. L.No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).
4. 11 U.S.C. ch. 12 (2012) ("Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or
Fisherman with Regular Annual Income").
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (2012).
6. The modem environmental movement is generally considered to have
begun in 1962 with the publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, which was
among the first articulations of contemporary ecological theory. Silent Spring
spurred a series of high-profile studies vindicating Carson's claims that
uncontrolled pesticide use could lead to severe harm to animals and humans. Soon
thereafter, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress passed the country's first
major federal environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act, Clean Water
Act, CERCLA, and the National Environmental Protection Act.
7. See J. B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 293 (2000).
8. Id. at 267.
9. Counting crop insurance subsidies, disaster relief programs, and direct cash
payments for commodity crop subsidies, farms have received over $292 billion in
government aid since 1995. The United States Summary Information, EWG FARM
2014] 317
318 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
goal of environmental law is to reallocate the external costs of
pollution onto the polluters themselves. In the absence of such
regulation, the costs of pollution are borne by the society, which
owns the air, water, and wildlife resources. When forced to
internalize the actual costs of their activities, whether by mandated
use of cleaner technologies, permit costs, or penalties for
noncompliance, regulated industries are given a tangible incentive to
diminish their pollution output. The influence of agricultural
exceptionalism has largely uncoupled this feedback cycle from
conventional food production systems. Though this results in lower
out-of-pocket retail prices, the efficiencies are illusory-consumers
also bear the invisible, lasting costs of widespread environmental
degradation."
The last twenty years have seen the improbable emergence of a
separate agricultural sector that voluntarily assumes the external costs
of food production. Organic, sustainable, and polycultural farming
operations, which this Article collectively terms "alternative
agriculture,"1 2 eschew conventional agriculture's resource-intensive
SUBSIDY DATABASE, http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000 (last visited Jan.
14, 2014).
10. See Brian M. Riedl, How Farm Subsidies Harm Taxpayers, Consumers, and
Farmers, Too, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, No. 2043 (June 20, 2007); see
also Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition: Agricultural
Trade Policy through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. STATE J. INT'L L.
345, 361 (2006). For example, subsidy payments account for as much as forty-
seven percent of corn farmers' income. Timothy A. Wise, The Paradox of
Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement Issues, Agricultural Dumping, and Policy
Reform 14 (Global Dev. & Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available
at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/04-02AgSubsidies.pdf.
11. Quantifying the external costs of an industry as diverse and diffuse as
agriculture is notoriously difficult. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., EXPLORING HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF FOOD-WORKSHOP
SUMMARY (2012), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record id=13521. In 2004, Erin M. Tegtmeir and Michael D. Duffy
estimated "conservatively" that external environmental and human health costs of
U.S. agricultural production amounted to $5.7 billion to $16.9 billion annually.
Erin M. Tegtmeir & Michael D. Duffy, External Costs of Agricultural Production
in the United States, 2 INT'L J. AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 14 (2004).
12. For a discussion contrasting alternative and conventional agriculture, see
Steve Padgitt & Peggy Petrzelka, Making Sustainable Agriculture the New
Conventional Agriculture: Social Change and Sustainability, in SUSTAINABLE
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model in favor of innovative farming practices that minimize
synthetic inputs and environmentally harmful effects.13 The farming
methods that comprise "alternative agriculture" span a broad
spectrum, from quarter-acre urban rooftop vegetable farms to
thousand-head cattle grazing operations, but they are united in their
tacit rejection of the contemporary food production regime.
Alternative agriculture benefits from neither the monetary nor the
legal subsidies granted to conventional agriculture, yet it thrives.14
From 1990 to 2010, annual sales of organic food alone grew from $1
billion to $26.7 billion.15 These dramatic economic gains have been
made without the support of the comprehensive safety net created for
commodity producers. For example, until recently, the United States
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency
(RMA) perceived organic agriculture to be riskier than conventional
agriculture, and applied a five percent surcharge for organic
insurance premiums. In February 2013 the RMA announced plans to
remove this surcharge in response to a report from the Office of the
Inspector General.16 When organic farmers of row crops like corn or
soybeans do suffer crop losses, they are compensated at the same
rates as conventional farmers, despite a higher input cost and a per-
bushel price that is usually well in excess of its commodity
AGRICULTURE SYSTEMS 261 (Jerry L. Hatfield & Douglas L. Karlen, eds., 1994),
which was published during the early development of the modem alternative
agriculture movement.
13. See generally Leo Horrigan et al., How Sustainable Agriculture Can
Address the Environmental and Human Health Harms of Industrial Agriculture,
110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 445 (2002), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1240832/pdf/ehpOl 10-000445.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Nevin Cohen, How Great Cities Are Fed Revisited: Ten Municipal
Policies to Support the New York City Foodshed, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
691, 695 (2011) (noting $866 in unfulfilled demand in New York City for locally-
produced food, which is less reliant than conventional food supplies on pollution-
generating transportation and storage).
15. Industry Statistics and Projected Growth, ORGANIC TRADE Ass'N, http://
www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html (last updated June 8, 2011).
16. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RMA: FEDERAL CROP
INSURANCE-ORGANIC CROPS, FEDERAL CROPS INSURANCE: ORGANIC CROPS,
AUDIT REPORT 05601-0006-KC 26 (2013), http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/
05601-0006-KC.pdf.
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corollary.1 7 Furthermore, because organic farmers do not use
synthetic production inputs, they do not make use of the federal
regulatory "subsidies" that heavily incentivize the use of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides.
Organic agriculture is certainly not an altogether "green"
industry, 19 but along with other forms of alternative agriculture it
represents a step in the direction of environmentally-sound food
production.20 Furthermore, its rapid growth in the absence of
socialized support programs indicates an increased willingness of
consumers to pay a price for their food that more accurately reflects
its cost of production.21 This would seem to run contrary to the
conventional agricultural wisdom that countenances only higher
yields and lower sticker prices at the grocery store. As alternative
agriculture continues to expand in sophistication and market reach, it
also challenges the legal and economic bases upon which the modern
edifice of agricultural exceptionalism is built.
Part I of this Article illuminates conventional agriculture's most
significant legal privileges through a discussion of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). Part II offers contrasting examples of conventional and
alternative agricultural practices, their use (or not) of regulatory
exemptions, and the ensuing environmental effects. Part III concludes
by suggesting that the growth of the alternative agricultural sector
demonstrates the potential of subsidy-free food production, and
argues that a more symmetrical legal regime will spur innovation to
improve conditions for the environment and consumers alike.
17. See Karen Klonsky, Comparison ofProduction Costs and Resource Use for
Organic and Conventional Production Systems, 94 AM. J. OF AGRIC. EcoN. 314
(2012).
18. See infra Part I, for a brief illustration of some of these regulatory
"subsidies."
19. See, e.g., Anthony Trewavas, Urban Myths of Organic Farming, 410
NATURE 409, 409-10 (2001).
20. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Food Security, and
Agrobiodiversity: Toward a Just, Resilient, and Sustainable Food System, 22
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 513-15 (2011).
21. For an overview of non-farmers' increasing participation in the American
food system, see Margaret Sova McCabe, Foodshed Foundations: Law's Role in
Shaping Our Food System's Future, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (2011).
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I. LOOPHOLES AND EXEMPTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Clean Water Act
When passed in 1972, the CWA was an ambitious statute which
aimed to make all American waterways fishable and swimmable by
1983.22 The CWA established an aggressive program to monitor
23
water quality and curtail further pollution. Under the CWA most of
the nation's surface waters have seen dramatic improvement, but the
Act's carve-outs for conventional agriculture have hampered
comprehensive progress. The CWA includes several statutory
provisions that benefit farms, which the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) augmented with additional regulatory exemptions.
The CWA set up the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES), which governs the rationing of permits to would-
be water polluters. The NPDES is thorough, imposing high
24
monitoring and reporting burdens on permittees. The permit system
regulates discharges from "point sources," such as industrial facilities
or wastewater pipes, which discharge effluents from discrete pipes,
channels, ditches, or ducts. Many streams of agricultural water
pollution, such as pesticide-laden return flows from irrigation
systems, fit squarely within the CWA's original 1972 definition of
point sources, yet the EPA has steadfastly resisted requiring
permits-first by administrative fiat; then, after the courts ordered
EPA to regulate farms pursuant to the CWA,25 by a 1977 Act of
22. The CWA's "fishable/swimmable" standards are a product of its language
at 33 U.S.C.A. 1251(a)(2), which declares "it is the national goal that wherever
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water be achieved by July 1, 1983." See also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 564 F.2d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
23. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012) (originally enacted as Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972)).
24. Id. § 1301(a); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General
Permits under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 409 (2007).
25. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1382-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
2014] 321
322 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Congress explicitly excluding agricultural waste as point-source
pollution for the purposes of the NPDES wastewater requirements,
The term "point source" means "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This
term does not include agricultural storm water discharges and return
flows from irrigated agriculture."26 Congress amended the CWA
again in 1987 to expand the exemption to also cover farms' storm
water runoff.27
The point/nonpoint source distinction favors farms in other parts of
the CWA, as well. Nonpoint sources such as farmlands or roads are
notoriously difficult to regulate, as the pollution they generate tends
to be diffuse and difficult to measure (until, of course, it collects in
waterways or aquifers). The Act attempted to cope with this problem
by punting the burden of regulation to the states. Chapter 208, for
example, instructs states to identify "impaired" bodies of water and
the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), or level of further
pollution each can tolerate while also meeting water quality
standards, of each. 28 TMDLs are quality-based, not effluent-based,
standards, so meeting them requires at least a consideration of
nonpoint source water pollution. Though the EPA has approval
authority over states' TMDL compliance plans, it has generally given
them wide discretion in choosing how to meet their TMDL
standards. 29 Rural states that are heavily dependent on agriculture
have thus been free to leave farm waste unregulated, even though to
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit found in
Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009),
that despite this statutory exclusion, pesticide application qualifies as point source
pollution, and in 2011 the EPA finalized a rule to require NPDES permits for many
pesticides. The new rule, however, leaves agricultural pesticide use exempt from
permitting requirements. See Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Pesticide General Permit for Point Source Discharges From the
Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011).
27. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 401, 101 Stat. 7, 65-66
(1987) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1)).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2012).
29. See id. § 1313(d).
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regulate it would often represent lower marginal costs of pollution
reduction.30
This decentralized approach to water quality regulation has created
a haphazard regime that frustrates the general intent of the CWA.
Though there are admittedly practical challenges to the regulation of
nonpoint source farm pollution, large-scale agriculture is
concentrated within relatively few states.31 The geographically
concentrated political power of the agricultural industry can chill
state governments' incentives to impose tighter environmental
restrictions. In essence, farmers have the ability to pollute public
waterways and may do so with the oversight of local agencies
predisposed to defer to their political and economic influence. In
practice, the CWA's "point-source polluter" exemption is a de jure
entitlement to pollute, whereas any other industry must pay dearly for
the same privilege. And the environmental degradation caused by the
nonpoint source exemption for farmers is far from incidental-the
EPA admits that this source of water pollution is responsible for forty
32percent of the pollution in the navigable waters of the United States,
and agriculture is the single most responsible sector.33
Perversely, a host of federal programs tacitly acknowledge this
right and seek to induce a modicum of environmentally-conscious
behavior by offering farmers various economic incentives to mitigate
some of the degradation caused by conventional agriculture. Certain
provisions of the CWA seem to suggest that the Department of
30. Ruhl, supra note 7, at 303-04.
31. For example, in 2004, over half the United States' agricultural yields came
from only ten states. In descending order of yields, these states are: California,
Iowa, Texas, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Kansas, North Carolina, Wisconsin,
and Indiana. Table 20-States Ranked by Level and Growth of Farm Output, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC. EcoN. RESEARCH SERV. (May 5, 2010), http://www.ers.usda.gov/
datafiles/Agricultural Productivity in the US/State RankingTables_/table20.xls.
By way of comparison, those same states together contain less than thirty-five
percent of the country's population.
32. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation's Largest Water Quality Problem,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/outreach/
pointl.cfm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
33. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS, 2004 REPORTING CYCLE: FINDINGS 12 (2009), available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/
2009_05_20_305b_2004report report2004pt3.pdf.
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Agriculture may best deal with the issue of nutrient run-off by
contracting with nonpoint source polluters to forsake their
entitlement to pollute:
The Secretary of Agriculture, with the concurrence of the
Administrator, and acting through the Soil Conservation
Service and such other agencies of the Department of
Agriculture as the Secretary may designate, is authorized
and directed to establish and administer a program to enter
into contracts, subject to such amounts as are provided in
advance by appropriation acts, of not less than five years
nor more than ten years with owners and operators having
control of rural land for the purpose of installing and
maintaining measures incorporating best management
practices to control nonpoint source pollution for improved
water quality in those States or areas for which the
Administrator has approved a plan under subsection (b) of
this section .... 34
A host of USDA programs seek to convince, cajole, or bribe
conventional farmers to adopt agricultural practices that would
alleviate the problem of nutrient runoff. For example, subsidies are
available for farmers who plant buffer strips strategically placed to
catch pesticides and nutrients before it can run off into navigable
waterways.35 The Agricultural Water Enhancement Program provides
financial and technical assistance to farmers who implement water
quality enhancing agricultural practices.36 The USDA also offers
grants for conventional farmers to learn nutrient timing techniques
that sync soil fertilization to within periods of typically dry
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(j) (2012).
35. Farmers that plant buffer strips increase their eligibility for USDA
incentives through the Conservation Stewardship Program. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1470
(2011); see also NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., FARMERS' GUIDE TO THE
CONSERVATION STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM 11 (2011), http://
sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/NSAC-Farmers-Guide-to-
CSP-2011 .pdf.
36. The Agricultural Water Enhancement Program is a subprogram within
USDA's Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). See 7 C.F.R. §
1466.9.
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weather.37 All of these costly programs in essence treat agricultural
pollution as a right that must be repurchased from the farmer, again
at public expense.
Because the CWA cannot compel good farm stewardship, other
organs of the federal government are left to incentivize individual
instances of good behavior from agricultural producers. In this
regulatory regime, the public can either swim, drink, and recreate in
the polluted effluvia created by nonpoint source agricultural
pollution, or pay a ransom to mitigate a fraction of this pollution
through special payment programs.
B. Clean Air Act
Conventional farms release high concentrations of airborne
pesticides, ozone, and particulate matter into the air. Ranked by
ambient air quality, four of the nation's bottom five cities are in
agricultural, not urban, communities.38 But the CAA lacks the scope
to effectively regulate these emissions. The CAA is designed
primarily to address large stationary sources of air pollution, such as
electricity generating facilities or industrial manufacturing plants,
which produce more air pollution than most individual farms.
Though their aggregate discharges are significant, most farms on
their own do not qualify as "major sources" of air pollutants, and
thereby escape the CAA's rigid technology-based command-and-
control regulatory programs. 39 Instead, many of the noxious and
37. See id. § 1466.
38. See Most Polluted Cities, STATE OF THE AIR, AM. LUNG Ass'N, http://
www.stateoftheair.org/2012/city-rankings/most-polluted-cities.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2014). The American Lung Association ranks cities in three categories;
ozone, year round particle pollution, and short-term particle pollution. Agricultural
communities comprise four out of the five bottom cities in each category.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012) defines a "major source" of air pollution as
any source emitting ten tons or more of a single regulated pollutant, or twenty-five
tons or more of a combination of such pollutants. Most farms do not meet this
threshold, but some do, particularly animal feeding operations and dairies. The
EPA attempted in late 2001 to grant a special waiver to California farms that
exceeded the CAA's emissions threshold, but revoked the order in the face of
litigation from environmental justice groups after just a few months. See Settlement
Agreement, Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 02-70160 (9th
Cir. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/ca/
titlevsettlement0502.pdf.
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malodorous airborne pollutants farms emit are left to case-by-case
adjudications under local zoning and nuisance laws.40
Farms (particularly livestock operations) also generate tremendous
amounts of greenhouse gases, together producing from eighteen
percent41 to as much as fifty-one percent of all anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions.42 This high figure is particularly
significant in light of record-breaking (and rising) average global
temperatures and the landmark case Massachusetts v. EPA, in which
the court officially deemed greenhouse gases a "pollutant" under the
CAA and ordered the EPA to begin regulating them.43 In its ensuing
rulemakings, however, the EPA has stuck to the CAA's original
focus on regulating large facilities, and in a 2010 "tailoring rule"
officially exempted most agricultural operations from requiring
emissions permits.44
C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act
CERCLA 45 is a robust statute that shifts the costs of remediating
contaminated land onto its owners. Its primary mechanism is rather
harsh: it imposes strict, joint, and retroactive (and expensive) liability
on all of a site's current and past owners and lessees, including those
who may have been otherwise innocent of any contaminating
activities. 46 CERCLA section 102 identifies a wide range of
hazardous substances, including many commonly used on farms, that
when present in the soil may trigger a mandatory cleanup. 47 The
statute provides very few options for the owner of a contaminated
40. See Warren A. Braunig, Note, Reflexive Law Solutions for Factory Farm
Pollution, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1516 (2005).
41. LIVESTOCK, ENV'T & DEV., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK'S LONG
SHADOW 112 (2006), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0701e/a0701e.pdf.
42. Robert Goodland & Jeff Anhang, Livestock and Climate Change, WORLD
WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 10, 11; see also Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 512.
43. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
44. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40
C.F.R pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
46. Id. § 9607.
47. Id.
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site to escape liability, exempting only contamination caused by an
act of God, act of war, unrelated third party (the rogue trespassing
dumper), and the "application of a pesticide product registered under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act."48
CERCLA also exempts farms from monitoring and reporting
obligations associated with "releases" of hazardous substances into
the environment. The statute provides for an extremely broad
definition of "release," but explicitly excludes "normal application of
fertilizer." 49 Farms, then, can legally use pesticides without
informing surrounding communities of the quantity or nature of the
substances released.
II. EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS IN
PRACTICE-AND THEIR ALTERNATIVE COUNTERPARTS
A. Beef
Conventional beef farms exemplify an industry that benefits from a
wide range of environmental law exemptions at various stages along
the production process, and also serves to illustrate one nascent
attempt at water pollution regulation.
Beef-cattle actually do begin and then spend the majority of their
lives on the bucolic range idealized in folk music and agrarian
paintings.so Cattle typically spend eighteen to twenty-two months
maturing on pasture to a weight of approximately six to seven
hundred pounds.5 1 During this time the average beef cattle produces
48. Id. § 9607(i).
49. Id. § 9601(22). The statute defines a release to be any "spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant)" of a regulated substance. Id.
50. Though the development of pastureland often displaces endemic species'
habitats. See Anthony B. Schutz, Toward a More Multi-Functional Rural
Landscape: Community Approaches to Rural Land Stewardship, 22 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 633, 645 (2011).
51. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, GLOBAL BEEF TRADE: EFFECTS OF ANIMAL
HEALTH, SANITARY, FOOD SAFETY, AND OTHER MEASURES ON U.S. BEEF
EXPORTS, INVESTIGATION No. 332-488, at 3-3 (2008), http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4033.pdf.
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52
up to thirteen tons of manure, which ranchers are generally free to
allow to flow into public waterways as "nonpoint source" pollution.53
Cattle are thereafter concentrated into unnaturally dense populations
in order to be "finished" on specially formulated, high calorie diets.5
One of the motives for this production cycle is flavor-driven. Since
the widespread adoption of modern beef production methods in
response to regulatory largesse, consumers have exhibited a higher
probability of purchasing and consuming beef that exhibits more fat-
tissue "marbling."5 The USDA's 1997 creation of its highly-
recognized three-tiered beef grading system56 served to formalize and
encourage this trend. Beef carcasses are stratified by fat content, and
beef with the highest marbling of "Prime" fetch the highest value.
There are several factors that may contribute to a carcass achieving a
"Prime" rating, such as animal genetics, feed formulation, and age at
slaughter, but the easiest way is to first pass the cattle through a feed-
lot, also known as a Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation
57(CAFO).
52. See MIDWEST PLAN SERV., LIVESTOCK WASTE FACILITIES HANDBOOK,
MWPS-18, at 2.1 tbl. 2-1 (3rd ed. 1993), available at http://
animalrangeextension.montana.edu/articles/natresourc/cnmp/other/
manure tabl1.htm.
53. See Jullee Kim, Applying Sustainable Land Use Development Studies to
Sustainable Agriculture: Are the Conditions Ripe for a Successful Movement
Toward Sustainable Agriculture?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1033, 1043-44 (2013).
54. See, e.g., M.L. Galyean, Protein Levels in Beef Cattle Finishing Diets:
Industry Application, University Research, and Systems Results, 74 J. ANIM. SCI.
2860-70 (1996).
55. See W. J. Platter et al., Effects of Marbling and Shear Force on Consumers'
Willingness to Pay for BeefStrip Loin Steaks, 83 J. ANIMAL SCI. 890, 895 (2005).
56. LIVESTOCK & SEED DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., UNITED STATES
STANDARDS FOR GRADES OF CARCASS BEEF (1997), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName STELDEV3002979.
57. See M. I. Fernndez & B. W. Woodward, Comparison of Conventional and
Organic Beef Production Systems: I Feedlot Performance and Production Costs,
61 LIVESTOCK PROD. SCI. 213, 221 (1999) (finding that raising steers in
conventional CAFO feeding systems is "the most efficient and fastest way" for
them to reach slaughter weight and fat content).
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Concentrating livestock populations has a host of legitimate
economic rationales.5 8 Logistically, it is much easier to co-locate
livestock with granaries and feed-milling, conveyors, and the farm
equipment which facilitate the distribution of feed. Acreage is
conserved, as are veterinary and labor resources.
All of the economic efficiencies created by concentration,
however, create new problems of waste-management. Cattle in
particular produce prodigious amounts of metabolic waste. 59 Gaseous
components of this waste, notably methane and carbon dioxide, go
unregulated under the EPA's 2010 Clean Air Act Tailoring Rule. 60
Solid and liquid wastes are too concentrated for easy dispersal, so are
instead sequestrated in manmade manure lagoons. 6 1 These lagoons
are periodically drained so that the nutrients contained within them
62
may be mechanically distributed on croplands -which, as
"application of fertilizer," need not be disclosed, despite the latent
antibiotics, hormones, and synthetic chemicals that may leach from
cattle waste into the soil.
Ideally, nutrient management of this sort works as a biological
algebra problem-wastes created in a concentrated environment are
eventually distributed by deliberate application as fertilizer for
various forms of plant-based agriculture. The EPA regulates this
balancing act of nutrient management through the CWA-CAFOs do
63in fact qualify as "point-source" polluters. CAFOs must therefore
apply for NPDES permits and develop and implement nutrient
58. JAMES M. MACDONALD & WILLIAM D. McBRIDE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE: SCALE, EFFICIENCY,
AND RISKS, EB-43, at 25-26 (2009).
59. For example, one 2004 study found that the average lactating dairy cow
produced about 140 pounds of manure per day. W. P. Weiss, Factors Affecting
Manure Excretion by Dairy Cows, 2004 PROC. CORNELL NUTRITION CONF. 11, 14,
http://dairy.osu.edu/resource/feed/canc%/o20manure%/o20paper%/o20for%/o20web.pdf.
60. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40
C.F.R pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
61. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WASTE
TREATMENT LAGOON CONSERVATION PRACTICE STANDARD No. 359, at 1 (2003).
62. Id.; NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NUTRIENT
MANAGEMENT, CONSERVATION PRACTICE STANDARD No. 590, at 1 (2013), http://
www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE DOCUMENTS/stelprdbl046896.pdf
63. 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 412 (2013).
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management plans. Even when functioning "according to plan,"
sequestration and open-air storage of waste localizes a phalanx of
volatile airborne pollutants, including ammonia and hydrogen
sulfide. Exempt from CAA regulations, these pollutants escape into
the air inhibited only to the extent to the surrounding community's
ability to bring a costly, difficult nuisance lawsuit.
Furthermore, the delicate equation can change dramatically as a
result of periodic flooding. Any CAFO lagoon in a region susceptible
to flooding poses a potential environmental disaster to an entire
geographic region. In 1995, an eight-acre manure lagoon at
Oceanview Farms in North Carolina burst through its dam and
poured twenty-five million gallons of livestock excrement into the
New River,64 killing virtually all aquatic life within seventeen miles
of the incident. This is perhaps the most notorious instance of CAFO
catastrophe, but it exemplifies the principle that when CAFOs fail,
once again the cost of the failure is born by society as a result of the
regulatory regime which permitted their existence in the first place.
Beef that is produced and marketed as "grass-fed" obviates the
CAFO, and all of its socialized risks, from its production entirely.
Grass-fed beef consumers are not motivated by the typical "Prime,"
"Choice," "Select" triarchy of gradation. Grass-fed beef is by the
nature of its production, much leaner than commodity beef, and this
has become a selling point of the product rather than a liability.
Grass-fed production has a second-order environmental benefit.
Federal guidelines on grass-fed marketing claims limit the amount of
grain cattle can receive. According to the Agricultural Marketing
Service, a division of the USDA:
Grass and forage shall be the feed source consumed for the
lifetime of the ruminant animal, with the exception of milk
consumed prior to weaning. The diet shall be derived solely
from forage consisting of grass (annual and perennial),
forbs (e.g., legumes, Brassica), browse, or cereal grain
crops in the vegetative (pre-grain) state. Animals cannot be
64. Michael Satchell, Hog Heaven and Hell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan 22,
1996, at 55.
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fed grain or grain byproducts and must have continuous
access to pasture during the growing season.65
This production method is therefore independent of commodity grain
production, itself a form of production heavily dependent on
environmental degradation at the un-accounted for expense of public
resources.
B. Crops
American crop farmers used 684 million pounds of pesticides in
2007.66 Grains are the top culprit, with corn production alone
67
comprising over half of this pesticide usage, but a large percentage
of conventionally-produced fruits and vegetables (including over
eighty percent of all onions, watermelons, and cucumbers) also
receive pesticide treatment.68 Such heavy pesticide use draws on
several regulatory exemptions: it is excluded from CERCLA
liability69 and NPDES permitting requirements, 70 and what little
oversight the government exercises under hazardous chemical
71
registration statutes is largely toothless. In addition to the water
contamination that results from these ongoing chemical releases,
conventional crop farming also contributes to water salinization and
65. United States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims, Grass
(Forage) Fed Claim for Ruminant Livestock and the Meat Products Derived From
Such Livestock, 72 Fed. Reg. 58,631, 58,637 (Oct. 16, 2007).
66. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
INDICATORS, 2012, EIB-98, at 21 (Craig Osteen et al. eds., 2012), http://
www.ers.usda.gov/media/874175/eib98.pdf. Altogether, these pesticides cost
farmers $7.87 billion. Id.
67. Id. at 21-22.
68. Agricultural Chemical Use: Corn, Upland Cotton and Potatoes 2010,
NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV. 3 (May 25, 2011), http://www.nass.usda.gov/
Surveys/Guide to NASSSurveys/ChemicalUse/FieldCropChemicalUseFact
Sheet06.09.1 1.pdf
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i) (2012).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
71. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (2012), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(2012), require pesticides to be registered but do little to restrict the amount or
method of their application. See Ruhl, supra note 7, at 309-12.
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aquifer depletion, soil erosion, nitrous oxide emissions, and
72
widespread habitat destruction and degradation.
Alternative agricultural methods (such as urban farming,
polycultural techniques such as rotational grazing, and hydroponic or
aquaponic production) are examples of economically viable methods
of production that do not pollute public water or airways and do not
require subsidy by environmental exemption.
Aquaponic production creates complimentary biological
relationships between plants and marine livestock, both of
commercial value. High-value crops, such as Chinese cabbage, leaf
basil, or even roses are provided with the metabolic waste of various
aquatic, edible species such as shrimp or tilapia. Ideally, water is
added to such a system only to offset losses attributable to
evaporation. Any metabolic waste generated by the marine life is
recycled into nutrient for plant or vegetative life. It is never pumped
out or given over to sewage treatment.73 Aquaponic production,
therefore, creates an entirely closed system that achieves economy
without degrading public resources such as waterways.
Urban farms are subject to unique concerns that encourage more
environmentally sound food production methods. Because many
urban farms' underlying soil may be contaminated-or, in the case of
rooftop farms, non-existent-they have increased incentive to build
raised beds or closed-loop irrigation systems that maximize nutrient
retention. Such a closed-loop system retains the bad as well as the
good, so it also discourages the use of synthetic chemicals that would
bioaccumulate in crops.
The economics of urban agriculture favor intensive vegetable
production, which further decreases demand for synthetic production
inputs. Due to space constraints, it is infeasible to grow
commoditized crops on urban farms, which in order to remain
economically viable tend instead to produce vegetables that can be
grown quickly and have high dollar values. Vegetable farming,
especially the diversified production common among urban farms, is
72. See Gonzalez, supra note 20, at 495-96; Ruhl, supra note 7, at 274-85.
73. See generally Andreas Graber & Ranka Junge, Aquaponic Systems: Nutrient
Recycling from Fish Wastewater by Vegetable Production, 246 DESALINATION 147
(2009).
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naturally less reliant on pesticides and fertilizers-its largest input is
labor.74
III. CONCLUSION: ALIGNING LAWS, MARKETS, AND GOOD
ENVIRONMENTAL SENSE
Despite the legal and economic privileges enjoyed by conventional
agriculture, alternative agriculture has grown from a boutique
microindustry to a major food production subsector over the last
twenty years. Wal-Mart's foray into alternatively-sourced food
exemplifies the resiliency and sophistication of the market. The fact
that Wal-Mart has an organic program at all is emblematic of
alternative agriculture's deep penetration into mainstream public
consciousness. From 2006 to 2007, Wal-Mart rolled out several
programs to procure more organic and locally-sourced food,
becoming one of the nation's largest retailers of food produced via
ostensibly alternative means.7 5 Soon thereafter a number of Wal-
Mart's "organic" milk suppliers suffered a series of embarrassing
regulatory sanctions and decertifications stemming from high-volume
practices that closely mimicked those of conventional milk
production.76 Rather than tolerate what it increasingly perceived as
"greenwash,"77 consumers policed their expectations by abandoning
Wal-Mart's alternative food offerings, and now it controls the
smallest proportion of organic food sales than any other major
-78grocery chain.
74. GARY LUCIER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., FRUIT
AND VEGETABLE BACKGROUNDER No. VGS-313-01, at 27 (2006), http://
webarchives.cdlib.org/swl5d8pg7m/http://ers.usda.gov/publications/VGS/apr06/
vgs31301/vgs31301.pdf.
75. Scarborough Research, When It Comes to Organic Food, West Is the Best,
PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/when-
it-comes-to-organic-food-the-west-is-the-best-58487687.html.
76. Stacy Mitchell, Eaters, Beware: Walmart Is Taking Over Our Food System,
GRIST.ORG (Dec. 30, 2011, 1:55 AM), http://grist.org/food/2011-12-30-eaters-
beware-walmart-is-taking-over-our-food-system.
77. Danielle Kurtzleben, Walmart Struggles to Overcome Environmental
Criticism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2012/04/20/walmart-struggles-to-overcome-environmental-criticism.
78. Mitchell, supra note 76.
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While the alternative food sector thrives with the support of its
consumer loyalty and market cache, it exists in the first place because
of the creativity and values of its producers. Through companion
planting, irrigation flowback recycling, rotational grazing, and a host
of other techniques that blend traditional farming methods with
modem technologies, alternative food farmers have shown a
remarkable aptitude for innovation. These techniques often yield
environmental benefits in tandem with economic advantages,
strengthening the alternative agriculture "brand" and demonstrating
incentives for further creativity and invention.79
This is not to imply that conventional agriculture has been stagnant
with respect to innovation. Recent inventions in seed hybridization,
genetic engineering, and development of new chemical fertilizers and
pesticides have been very successful in raising crop yields among
conventional monocultural crops such as corn and rice.so But these
innovations continue to be geared toward production of tonnage at
the exclusion of other objectives. Crop commodification and federal
programs such as artificially inflated demand for corn ethanol make a
conventional farm's earnings nearly entirely contingent upon the raw
quantity it produces. So as farms' yields have increased over the last
twenty years, so too has average net farm income (albeit unevenly),
particularly among large monocultural farms.81
79. See, e.g., Mark Lubell, Vicken Hillis, & Matthew Hoffman, Innovation,
Cooperation, and the Perceived Benefits and Costs of Sustainable Agriculture
Practices, 41 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 40 (2001), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol16/iss4/art23 (finding that innovations in sustainable viticulture tended to yield
both economic and environmental benefits).
80. See Pramod K. Agrawal & Sherry R. Jacob, Technologies for Increased
Crop Yield, Address at the International Seed Testing Association 2010
Conference (June 16, 2010), https://www.seedtest.org/upload/cms/user/ISTA-
June16-1040-Sympsessionl -Keynote-Agrawal.pdf (summarizing conventional
technological inputs and increased crop yields).
81. Median Farm Household Income Up in 2011 and Forecast Higher in 2012,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. EcoN. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartld=31715#.UxUYVha 
_UQ (last updated Sept. 17,
2012); As in Previous Drought Years, Net Farm Income in 2012 Is Expected to Be
Fairly Stable, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. EcON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/
topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/highlights-from-the-2012-farm-
income-forecast.aspx (last updated Aug. 29, 2012).
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But where conventional agriculture has been successful in
maintaining profitability, it has ignored other bottom lines. As
evidenced by its stalwart (and remarkably successful) opposition to
tighter environmental regulations, conventional agriculture has been
transparent in its systematic disregard of environmental health.
Public health is also left by the wayside. When over one-third of
American adults are obese, 82 the purpose of squeezing ever higher
yields of feed crops like corn and soy out of a single acre of farmland
is certainly not to feed the hungry. While the conventional
agricultural sector has tremendous potential for innovation, it lacks
the incentive to innovate in service of environmental or public health.
A more symmetrical legal regime could provide these incentives.
By tightening environmental restrictions on conventional agriculture,
lawmakers could both realign farms' economic priorities and begin to
level the field of competition between conventional and alternative
food producers. Bringing conventional agriculture's scientific and
financial resources (and its emphasis on profitability) to bear on
environmentally sound food production methods could also help
address alternative agriculture's most persistent bugbear: cost.
The CAA amendments of 1990 present an apt illustration of
corporate sector innovation in response to environmental regulation.
The amendments, authored in large part by Senator John McCain (R-
AZ), put in place a cap-and-trade regime governing sulfur dioxide
(SO 2) emissions from coal-fired power plants.83 Power plants were
given a finite number of allowances to emit SO2, which they could
trade with each other to meet a gradually decreasing statutorily
imposed cap on total national SO2 emissions. 84 Generators were thus
given the choice of either buying allowances to cover their SO2
emissions, or cutting their emissions and selling their leftover
allowances to other generators.8 5
Industry objected stridently in the lead up to the amendments'
passage, but once they took effect, the results were swift: recognizing
that buying emissions allowances was not a sustainable long-term
82. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., PREVALENCE OF OBESITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009-2010, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1 (NCHS Data
Brief No. 82, Jan. 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db82.pdf.
83. Pub. L. 101-549 § 403 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651(b)).
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7651(o) (2006).
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strategy, SO2 generators began to explore new ways of reducing their
emissions. Many of the technological and methodological advances
that power plants developed cut their operating costs as well as their
SO2 emissions-polluting less also turned out to be economically
efficient. 86 S02 emissions dropped precipitously, well exceeding the
reductions mandated by the statutory cap, and at a cost to industry far
below projections.8 7
Agricultural pollution does not lend itself to such an elegant
solution as cap-and-trade.88 The government's aversion to regulating
farms has only been partly political: with their diverse range of
localized environmental impacts that span several media, farms
represent a much harder nut to crack from a policy standpoint than do
coal-fired power plants.89 But on the other hand, unlike pre-1990
electricity generators, alternative agriculture has consistently
demonstrated its aptitude for environmentally beneficial
innovation-and has done so largely without the aid of governmental
incentives. If lawmakers and regulators cannot solve the challenges
of agricultural pollution, they can at least help to further empower the
sector to find its own solutions.
The wide array of legal loopholes in place to benefit conventional
agriculture presents no shortage of avenues by which to push the
sector toward more sustainable methods. Not all would require
legislative action or even new rulemakings. For example, the EPA
already has oversight and approval authority over states' biennial
TMDL compliance plans.9 0 EPA would thus be within its power to
issue, and enforce, agency guidance requiring TMDL plans to
meaningfully address "nonpoint source" water pollution from
agricultural sources. A more ambitious strategy requiring additional
86. Dallas Butraw, Innovation Under the Tradeable Sulphur Dioxide Emissions
Permits Program in the US Electricity Sector, OECD WORKSHOP ON INNOVATION
AND THE ENV'T (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 00-38, 2000), http://
www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-00-38.pdf.
87. Id. at 12-15, 24.
88. J.B. Ruhl, however, outlines a potential framework to allow water pollution
"trading" among farms. Ruhl, supra note 7, at 344-45.
89. See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND
ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 344 (2006)
(noting that "[t]oo large a regulated community can make it impossible to
implement and enforce requirements.").
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012).
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statutory authority would remove farms' exclusion from the
definition of "point source" altogether, bringing conventional
agriculture into the NPDES permitting system. Congress could also
end the statutory exemptions that license farms' unmonitored
application of fertilizers, or unchecked emissions of greenhouse
gases. Of course, if Congress were to commit to agriculture
regulation reform, it is empowered to employ less conventional
means as well: in addition to revoking conventional agriculture's
exemptions from traditional command-and-control regulation, for
example, lawmakers could also impose emissions taxes or reporting
requirements to provide farms with economic incentives to cut
pollution.
At least in the short term, any tightening of environmental
regulations on conventional farms will almost certainly raise food
prices, which have already been on the rise in recent years.92
Lawmakers could soften this blow by pairing stricter regulations with
cuts in the federal programs that prop up food prices, such as feed
crop subsidies, but are still likely to pay a considerable political cost
before consumers realize any tangible benefits. But this calculation
becomes less one-sided as conventional agriculture's environmental
harms-and the public's awareness of them-continue to build. The
trends that have brought alternative agriculture from the margins to
the mainstream show no sign of abating. The market has led the
way-it is now the law's responsibility to catch up.
91. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § §
11001-11050, requires most hazardous substance generators to record and report
their annual releases, which are published in an annual Toxic Release Inventory. In
2008, EPA implemented a rule exempting livestock farms from EPCRA reporting
requirements. 73 Fed. Reg. 76948-01 (Dec. 18, 2008).
92. Changes in Food Price Indexes, 2010 through 2014, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.
EcoN. RES. SERV. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/
Food Price Outlook/Food Price Outlook/PPIforecast.xls.
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